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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3527 
_____________ 
 
In Re: Grand Jury 
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania                                                    
District Court No. 3-10-mc-00235 
District Judge: The Honorable A. Richard Caputo                              
 
Argued January 26, 2011 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
and STEARNS, District Judge
*
 
 
 
(Filed: February 16, 2011 )                 
 
                                                 
*
 The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge 
for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________ 
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
The appellant is a target of a grand jury investigation.  
In connection with the investigation, federal agents executed 
a warrant to search the appellant‘s property and seized 
numerous documents.  To accommodate the appellant, the 
agents agreed to furnish him with copies of all seized 
documents.  Unsatisfied, the appellant moved for return of the 
documents, as well as any copies, on the ground that the 
search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.  The 
District Court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.  
As explained below, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial 
and will dismiss the appeal.       
I. 
 During an investigation by a grand jury sitting in 
Scranton, Pennsylvania, federal agents obtained a warrant to 
search the home and offices of the appellant.  The warrant 
affidavit is sealed, but the government has indicated that the 
appellant is being investigated for federal-program theft, 
extortion, fraud, and money laundering.  The warrant was 
executed on June 18, 2010; agents seized numerous 
documents and made copies of the appellant‘s hard drives 
(while leaving the computers undisturbed).  To mitigate any 
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inconvenience caused by the seizure, the agents agreed to 
provide the appellant with copies of the seized documents.   
Unappeased, the appellant filed a motion under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania.
1
  The motion challenged the validity 
of the search and seizure, and requested (1) that the warrant 
affidavit be unsealed, (2) that all seized evidence be returned 
to the appellant, (3) that any copies of the evidence be 
returned, and (4) that the government be ordered to cease 
inspection of the evidence pending a ruling on the motion.  
Importantly, the motion did not assert that the government‘s 
retention of the evidence was causing the appellant to 
experience hardship.  It claimed, instead, that the search and 
seizure ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment, and that the 
government thus had no business using the seized evidence 
against the appellant in criminal proceedings.   
The government filed two responses to the motion: one 
was a regular response and the other a supplemental ex parte 
response.  The regular response argued that the appellant‘s 
motion was not a motion for the equitable return of property 
(which is contemplated by Rule 41(g)), but was, instead, a 
premature motion to suppress evidence.  The response also 
                                                 
1
 Rule 41(g) (formerly Rule 41(e)) provides that a ―person 
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the 
deprivation of property may move for the property‘s return.‖  Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 41(g).  ―If [the court] grants the motion, [it] must 
return the property to the movant, but may impose reasonable 
conditions to protect access to the property and its use in later 
proceedings.‖  Id.   
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defended the search and seizure against constitutional attack, 
stressing that they were conducted pursuant to a duly issued 
warrant.   
The supplemental ex parte response, to which the 
sealed warrant affidavit was appended, explained that the 
government had a strong interest in maintaining the warrant 
affidavit under seal.  According to the government, unsealing 
the affidavit would cause the identities of confidential 
informants to be revealed, expose individuals and businesses 
to public obloquy though charges against them may never be 
brought, cause the release of confidential grand jury and tax 
information, and ―result in disclosing to [the appellant], prior 
to the initiation of charges, the precise areas of inquiry into 
which the investigation was looking, thereby facilitating [the 
appellant‘s] and other subjects‘ obstruction of the 
investigation.‖  Gov‘t Br. at 16.   
By order dated August 17, 2010, the District Court 
denied the appellant‘s motion.  It concluded that the appellant 
was not entitled to return of the seized property or unsealing 
of the warrant affidavit.  This appeal followed.   
II. 
 The appellant asserts that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 gives this 
Court jurisdiction to review the order denying the Rule 41(g) 
motion.  Section 1291 vests the courts of appeals with 
jurisdiction over ―appeals from all final decisions of the 
district courts of the United States.‖  Both sides agree that the 
question whether the District Court‘s order is final and 
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appealable is governed by the Supreme Court‘s decision in Di 
Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962).  Under Di Bella, 
denial of a pre-indictment Rule 41(g) motion is not final and 
appealable if the motion was in effect for the suppression of 
evidence.  See id. at 131–32.  ―Such a ruling is considered to 
be merely a step in the criminal process, and any rights 
involved are adequately protected in subsequent trial 
proceedings.‖  United States v. Premises Known as 608 
Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing Di 
Bella, 369 U.S. at 121).  Di Bella carved out an exception for 
orders denying motions that are truly independent of 
anticipated criminal proceedings.  Notably, however, ―[o]nly 
if the motion [1] is solely for return of property and [2] is in 
no way tied to a criminal prosecution in esse against the 
movant can the proceedings be regarded as independent.‖  
369 U.S. at 131–32.  Failing to observe these limitations, the 
Court explained, would undermine the policies against 
piecemeal appellate review and disrupting ongoing criminal 
prosecutions that underlie § 1291‘s final-judgment 
requirement.  See id. at 124, 126–29.    
 We have previously had occasion to apply Di Bella in 
circumstances similar to those presented here.  In In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1979), 
for example, a corporation produced documents in response 
to a subpoena duces tecum issued by a grand jury.  After 
handing over the documents, the corporation moved for their 
return, alleging that they had been procured through fraud.  
See id. at 806–07 & n.1.  The District Court denied the 
motion, and the corporation appealed.  We concluded that the 
District Court‘s order was not appealable:  
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In the grand jury context, nongovernment 
appeals of technically nonfinal decisions have 
been closely limited to orders denying motions 
for the return of property. But as we [have] 
observed . . . , the question whether a motion is 
for the return of property or whether it is for the 
suppression of evidence, and thus 
nonappealable, must be resolved by examining 
the essential character of the proceedings in the 
district court. [Here, i]t is not disputed that 
although the grand jury proceedings were at a 
standstill for a time, they have been resumed, 
and the conduct of [the corporation] is still the 
subject of inquiry. There is obviously the 
possibility of a criminal prosecution against the 
corporation and it cannot be said that the motion 
is in no way tied to a potential indictment. This 
is not an independent proceeding but merely a 
step in the criminal prosecution. Accordingly, 
the appeal will be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
Id. at 807 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  In 
other words, Di Bella‘s second requirement—that the motion 
be unrelated to an existing criminal prosecution against the 
movant—was not met because the corporation was the 
subject of an ongoing grand jury investigation.  See also 
United States v. Pantelidis, 335 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(noting that, ―[a]s a general principle, ‗an order denying 
return of property would not be final and appealable if the 
government were holding the property as evidence in a 
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potential criminal prosecution‘‖) (quoting Gov’t of the V.I. v. 
Edwards, 903 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1990)).   
 Our decision in United States v. Furina, 707 F.2d 82 
(3d Cir. 1983), is also instructive.  There, during a grand jury 
investigation, federal agents obtained and executed warrants 
to search the appellants‘ residences; the agents seized various 
documents for presentation to the grand jury.  Claiming that 
the search and seizure were invalid, the appellants filed a 
motion for return of the documents.  The District Court 
denied the motion, and an appeal followed.   
We dismissed the appeal.  In doing so, we found it 
―very clear‖ that the appellants‘ motion sought the 
suppression of evidence, not simply the return of property.  
Id. at 84.  Indeed, the motion had been filed pursuant to what 
is now Rule 41(g), and, at the time, granting such a motion 
automatically resulted in suppression.
2
  That the appellants‘ 
motion had sought not just the return of property but also the 
suppression of evidence was ―enough under Di Bella to 
require that . . . the appeal be dismissed.‖  Furina, 707 F.2d at 
84.  We also stated that, ―even though the appellants [we]re 
not under arrest or indictment,‖ a prosecution against them 
                                                 
2
 Before 1989, the Rule provided: ―A person aggrieved by an 
unlawful search and seizure may move the district court . . . for the 
return of the property . . . . If the motion is granted the property 
shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any 
hearing or trial.‖  Furina, 707 F.2d at 82 n.1 (quoting the Rule) 
(emphasis added).  The automatic-suppression provision was 
deleted from the Rule in 1989.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 advisory 
committee‘s note.    
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was nevertheless in esse for purposes of Di Bella, because 
they were subjects of an ongoing grand jury investigation.  Id. 
(citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d at 806).  We 
therefore held that the appellants did ―not satisfy the [second] 
requirement of Di Bella that the motion [be] in no way tied to 
a criminal prosecution in esse against the[m].‖  Id. at 84.   
Turning now to the case before us, we think it clear 
that the order denying the appellant‘s Rule 41(g) motion is 
not final and appealable.  We arrive at this conclusion for two 
independent reasons.  First, the motion plainly sought not just 
the equitable return of property, but also the suppression of 
evidence—i.e., to prevent the government from using the 
evidence in criminal proceedings.  This is evidenced by the 
motion‘s requests for any copies of the seized documents and 
for an order directing the government to cease inspecting the 
evidence pending a ruling.  See In re Search Warrant 
(Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that where 
the government has retained copies of seized documents and 
returned the originals to the movant, a motion for return 
implicitly seeks the suppression of evidence, not just the 
return of property); Meister v. United States, 397 F.2d 268, 
269 (3d Cir. 1968) (same).  Similarly, if the appellant really 
sought just the return of property—and not also 
suppression—then the government‘s offer to furnish him with 
copies of the seized evidence should have sufficed (after all, 
the appellant has not explained why he needs the originals, as 
opposed to copies, of the seized evidence).  See Matter of 949 
Erie St., 824 F.2d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1987) (―[W]here the 
government has offered to provide copies and the movants 
have not even attempted to show that copies are inadequate . . 
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. , we cannot find that the motion is directed primarily toward 
the return of the seized property [under Di Bella].‖).  Thus, 
the appellant‘s motion sought both the return of property and 
the suppression of evidence; its denial is therefore not 
appealable.  See Di Bella, 369 U.S. at 131–32 (denial of 
motion appealable only when ―motion [wa]s solely for return 
of property‖) (emphasis added); Furina, 707 F.2d at 84. 
To be sure, the appellant points out that prior to 1989, 
granting a Rule 41(g) motion automatically resulted in 
suppression of the restored evidence.  See Edwards, 903 F.2d 
at 272–73 & nn.1–3 (quoting and discussing the pre-1989 
version of the Rule).  Because suppression no longer is an 
automatic consequence of granting a Rule 41(g) motion, the 
appellant reasons that his motion should not be construed as 
seeking to suppress evidence.  The appellant misapprehends 
the effect of the 1989 amendment.  While it is true that a Rule 
41(g) motion no longer necessarily seeks suppression, this 
hardly means that it is impossible for such a motion to seek 
suppression.  Although the appellant‘s motion could have 
sought solely the return of property, in fact it did not: it 
sought both the return of property and the suppression of 
evidence.  Accordingly, the order denying the motion is not 
final and appealable under Di Bella.
3
     
                                                 
3
 Even before 1989, parties could file non-Rule 41(g) motions for 
the equitable return of property, see Clifford A. Godiner, Note, 
Interlocutory Appeal of Preindictment Suppression Motions Under 
Rule 41(e), 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1755, 1768–69 (1986), but appeals of 
orders denying such motions would be dismissed if, upon 
10 
 
Second, the property was seized in connection with an 
ongoing grand jury investigation of which the appellant is a 
target.  Given the clear connection between the motion and a 
criminal prosecution (albeit an incipient one), the appellant 
―do[es] not satisfy the [second] requirement of Di Bella that 
the motion [be] in no way tied to a criminal prosecution in 
esse against [him].‖  Furina, 707 F.2d at 84; see In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d at 806–07 (criminal prosecution 
is in esse when there is an ongoing grand jury investigation); 
Smith v. United States, 377 F.2d 739, 742 (3d Cir. 1967) 
(same); see also Di Bella, 369 U.S. at 131 (―Presentations 
before . . . a grand jury . . . are parts of the federal 
prosecutorial system leading to a criminal trial.  Orders 
granting or denying suppression in the wake of such 
proceedings are truly interlocutory, for the criminal trial is 
then fairly in train.‖); cf. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 
584 F.2d at 1300–01 (Di Bella‘s second requirement met 
where no criminal proceeding ―of any kind‖ was pending 
against the movant at the time the motion for return of 
property was filed).  We conclude, then, that the order 
denying the appellant‘s Rule 41(g) motion is not final and 
appealable.
4
  
                                                                                                             
examination, they sought not just the return of property but also 
suppression, see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d at 806–
07; Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d at 1299–1301.   
4
 An attorney representing associates of the appellant appeared at 
oral argument, and asserted that property belonging to his clients 
had been seized during the search of the appellant‘s offices.  The 
attorney argued that, even if the order denying the Rule 41(g) 
motion is not final and appealable as to the appellant, it is 
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One final point deserves mention.  In addition to the 
return and suppression of evidence, the appellant‘s motion 
requested that the warrant affidavit be unsealed.  But 
unsealing was requested merely to assist the appellant in 
arguing for return and suppression.  Thus, the District Court‘s 
refusal to unseal the affidavit—like its decision denying the 
return and suppression of evidence—is not appealable.  See 
Furina, 707 F.2d at 84 (―Appellants sought disclosure of the 
[sealed warrant] affidavit in order to secure evidence for the 
Rule 41[(g)] hearing.  The lack of finality which attaches to 
the order denying return and suppression necessarily applies 
to preliminary matters as well.‖).   
III. 
 For these reasons, we will dismiss the appeal.     
                                                                                                             
appealable as to his clients because—unlike the appellant—they 
are not under criminal investigation.  Because this contention was 
raised for the first time at oral argument, we will not consider it.  
See United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(an argument brought up for the first time at oral argument is 
waived).  Of course, nothing prevents the individuals from seeking 
relief in the District Court in the first instance.   
